are starting to voice their grievances, they are still a long way from the level of activism now in the United States.
For example, there was an article in The Economist about international institutional investors ousting Carlo DeBenedetti from the board of directors of Olivetti SpA. In that case, it appeared that the shareholders succeeded in removing Mr. DeBenedetti from the board of directors. 4 Mr. DeBenedetti, however, was replaced by one of his lieutenants and the international institutional investors only obtained four out of seventeen seats on the board of directors.
5
In my opinion, it could take five to seven years for the European corporate governance movement to attain the level of success it has in the United States.
IlL NEw FoRcEs IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The European system of corporate governance will change for several reasons. First, European institutional shareholders, such as pension funds, are becoming larger and more numerous such as those in the United States which are traditionally large institutional shareholders.' Many pensions funds in Europe represent government employees because key sectors of the economy, including the telephone companies, railways, and airlines, are government owned. These government owned companies do not have the large pension funds that are seen in the United States, because they do not receive the same funding. 7 When the government-owned corporations of Europe undergo privatization, the newly private companies will have ' See Gary L. Bergstrom, Europe's Coming Pension Revolution, WALL ST. J. EuR., Nov. 6, 1991 (stating that the European Community Commission approved draft legislation for a uniform pension fund industry throughout Europe).
4 See Ciao, Carlo, ECON., Sept 7, 1996, at 7 (reporting that Carlo DeBenedetti quit after pressure from the current CEO Francisco Ciao, and institutional investors); see also Olivetti Self-Destructs, ECON., Sept. 21, 1996 , at 16 (stating that a meeting of the foreign fund that controlled 25% of Olivetti triggered his resignation).
-'Id at 16 (stating that DeBenedetti's successor, Fransico Ciao, resigned). 
IV. Two-TIER BOARD IS ANALTERATIVE TO CLASSIC MODEL
Some Europeans are resisting change by claiming that a corporate governance model that utilizes a ' France Announces Plans to Set Up Pension Funds, RsurER Bus. REP., Dec. 2, 1993 (stating that the French government, which relies on the pay-as-you-go, or distribution system, where pensions are paid out from payments made by today's workers, plans to set up pension funds in order to guarantee pensions for the aging population and divert billions of francs into the stock market and newly privatized companies); see also Norma Cohen, Imro Chief Urges New Pensions Regulator, FiN. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1993 , at 10 (noting that the Commons' social security committee plans to examine the handling of the pension funds of a number of formerly state-owned companies, as part of an inquiry into the government's plans for the pension funds of soon-to-be-privatized businesses); Privatise Europe 's Pension System, Says Manager's Report, GLoBAL MONEY McMr., Oct. 3, 1994 , at 6 (describing a Manager's Report which shows that European countries will need to privatize their pension system, or face insurmountable deficits under their current system). ,3 Hawkins, supra note 12, at 8 (stating that 3 billion dollars of foreign capital has flowed into the Czech Republic in the first half of 1995).
two-tier board, such as in Germany or in Holland, is a better model. 4 The reason for the resistance in Germany is that banks are the largest shareholders and they are on the boards of almost every large corporation. The banks, however, are more than just shareholders, they are also stakeholders. Since banks are creditors, they may have different goals than pure shareholder value in terms of pure profitability." They want long-term stability and they want to keep their credit valuable. This may mean less aggressive growth and a different corporate policy than simply maximizing the profit as would be done for a pure
The German model consists of two boards: the management board and the supervisory board. STUr. 219, 239-44 (1993) (reviewing the two-tier board model and advocating its adoption in the United States); Jardine Fleming Group Reorganizes Officials, Creates Two-Tier Board, WALl. ST. J., Sept. 27, 1997 (noting that Jardine Fleming Group, Ltd. adopted a two-tier board in order to "reassure clients" after an investigation discovered regulatory violations in the company's big-fund management division Two-Tiers Won't Work Acc., Mar. 1995, at 18 (noting that in Germany the involvement of employees and long-term shareholders, such as banks, in supervisory boards may discourage rash decisions, but it also makes it difficult for companies to change direction quickly).
German companies are profitable, well managed and, over the long-term, have served their shareholders well.? They have also worked under greater social pressure than their American counterparts.
The importance of corporate governance will increase as new pension funds are created. These funds will become larger because of longer life expectancy of the beneficiaries, the need to fund the pension plans of former government-owned companies and the need for better funding of private corporations' pension funds. 24 The growing influence of the pension fund in Europe will surely lead to changes in the European corporate governance models. It may result in a governance model more like the one used in the United States, even though some people in the United States, particularly scholars, believe that the two-tier model is a better model.? I tend to think that is yet to be decided.
V. SHFTING TO MoRE SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN EUROPE
Europe is changing slowly. What was supposed to happen in 1992 is still not done in 1997. I think, however, that within the next five to seven years we will see more shareholder activism. Presently, shareholders are very passive, but the trend is moving toward shareholders being interested in participating in the life of the company. 
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See Commission on Tax'n, supra note 29 (discussing the lax disclosure requirements in Europe). Another reason why European shareholders are not more active is because some individual shareholders, due to the high taxation, keep their shares in a different jurisdiction from where they live and they want to stay incommunicado. This will not change until new shareholders come into the picture, such as pension funds or American institutions, and provide pressure to change the corporate structure and the system of corporate governance. The American Institutions, such as the California Public Employees' Retirement System ("CalPERS") and Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS") are making inroads by attending AGMs.
3 5 ISS opened an office in Paris to try to change the culture of the enterprise and make the boards understand that shareholders can, and in fact, want to vote. 36 I think that the biggest factor is that the banks, holding companies, and crossholders (companies that own each others shares) put cross-members on the board. 37 That means you have a club of board members, which is really limited to a few people, who sit on each other's boards?
8 Change, however, will be slow because European corporations still have a huge amount of money and capital, and because they have been working for hundreds of years that way. Through cascade holdings, a relatively small amount of capital is managing the entire company.
A few years ago there was a large holding company in Belgium called Societe G6n6rale de Belgique, which has since been acquired. 39 It had holdings in up to 1,400 different companies and almost always had representatives on the board of directors of each of those companies. 40 Sometimes the holding size was not more than 5 percent and the rest of the shares were dissipated in the public, but ownership of merely 5 to 20 percent gave it control of a company. The possibility of control by a minority is still the case today. For change to occur, the diversification of the shareholder profile is needed. That is happening, but it is happening slowly.
VI. UNITED STATES INSTITUTION'S INFLUENCE ON SHAPING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Diversification will happen more rapidly in the Eastern European countries where of the corporations were state-owned. These countries are now in search of capital and are looking to the United States'
institutions. 4 ' The institutions' answers are, "Fine, we want to take a stake in your capital, but we want it our way." Therefore, the corporate governance models will shift sooner in those countries than in the old, 46 In Europe, the classical sources of capital are the holding companies and families. There are still a lot of family-owned or partially family-owned companies and they still have people on the board. Even if they only own 2 or 3 percent, they still have a lot of power. These companies will have a difficult time meeting the never-ending demand for capital. They will want to grow and become more international as trade barriers fall; therefore, they will need more capital. To get that capital they will have to go to the capital markets which means working with institutional investors and governance-oriented shareholders.
47

VII. CONCLUSION
Europe is very diverse. The two-tier board system is not everywhere in Europe.
4
" Some European companies have classical boards, some have outside directors, some do not. 49 Because of market pressure," I believe that European corporations will move toward the classical American model of corporate governance. But that change will occur slowly.
As a reference, the European Community authorities started discussing corporate status in 1956 in order to create a cross-border corporate status and they are still discussing it today. European unification was supposed to occur in 1992, yet it has not been completed. Maybe it will be done by the year 2000. Aug. 29, 1994 , at A7 (noting that many European countries are considering corporate governance structures and may be moving toward the Anglo-American model); see also Lowengrad, supra note 42 (noting study of 140 European companies' corporate governance achievement rankings).
